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____________ 
 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
  
The question presented in this consolidated appeal is 
whether appellants, Albert Savani, Sean Herbert, and Richard 
Roe,
1
 are eligible for reductions of their sentences pursuant to 
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  In each case, the appellant was 
convicted of a cocaine base (crack) related offense, the 
government moved for a downward departure due to the 
appellant’s substantial assistance, and the District Court 
granted the departure and sentenced the defendant below the 
statutory mandatory minimum.  Shortly thereafter,  
the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) became law, and the 
United States Sentencing Commission approved Amendment 
750, a retroactive amendment, which lowered the base 
offense levels applicable to crack cocaine offenses.  In light 
of Amendment 750, appellants moved to further reduce their 
sentences.   
 
Despite the government’s willingness at the time of the 
original sentencing to have appellants sentenced below the 
mandatory minimum sentence, the government opposed the 
FSA motions in each case on the basis that the original 
                                              
1
 On February 27, 2012, Roe filed an unopposed motion to 
proceed under pseudonym, which we will grant.   
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sentences were governed by the mandatory minimums.  The 
government contends that in this situation, in which the 
guidelines range is below the statutory mandatory minimum 
sentence, the mandatory minimum is defined as the 
―guideline sentence.‖  Although the qualifying amount of 
cocaine base necessary to trigger the mandatory minimum 
sentence has now been increased, the government asserts 
nevertheless that the duration of the statutorily required 
minimum sentence, the ―guideline sentence,‖ has not been 
changed; thus, the appellants are still subject to the mandatory 
minimum sentence.  The district courts denied the motions on 
this basis.   
 
On appeal, appellants contend that the district courts 
erred in denying their motions because (1) their terms of 
imprisonment were, at least in part, based on a sentencing 
range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing 
Commission and (2) a sentence reduction is consistent with 
the applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing 
Commission.  With respect to the latter, appellants assert that 
this Court’s interpretation in United States v. Doe, 564 F.3d 
305 (3d Cir. 2009), of the term ―applicable guideline range‖ 
is superseded by the Sentencing Commission’s November 
2011 revisions to the Guidelines, which included, for the first 
time, a definition of the phrase ―applicable guideline range.‖  
For the reasons set forth below, we agree that Doe has been 
superseded.  We conclude that defendants, who are convicted 
of crack cocaine offenses and whose original sentences were 
below the mandatory minimum applicable to them because of 
substantial assistance to the government, are not barred for 
policy reasons from seeking a reduction of sentence pursuant 
to § 3582(c)(2).  We will, therefore, vacate the orders of the 
district courts and remand these cases for further proceedings.     
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I.  Background  
The facts regarding Savani, Herbert, and Roe are 
essentially similar.   
 
A.  Albert Savani  
In May 2008, Savani entered into a cooperation plea 
agreement with the government and pled guilty to one count 
of conspiracy to distribute, and to possess with intent to 
distribute, more than 50 grams of crack cocaine, in violation 
of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A) and 846.  At that 
time, the base offense level dictated by the crack cocaine 
guideline for this conviction was 30.  See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) 
(Nov. 2007).  Savani received a two-level reduction for his 
minor role in the offense and a three level reduction for 
acceptance of responsibility, yielding a total adjusted offense 
level of 25.  Based upon his total offense level of 25 and a 
criminal history category of II, Savani’s initial guideline 
sentencing range was 63-78 months of imprisonment.  See 
U.S.S.G. § 5A.  However, because of the amount of crack 
cocaine involved in the offense, Savani was subject to a ten-
year mandatory minimum sentence, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(a)(1)(A).  See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1(h) (Nov. 2007).  
Therefore, his guideline sentence was deemed to be 120 
months.  See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b) (―Where a statutorily 
required minimum sentence is greater than the maximum of 
the applicable guideline range, the statutorily required 
minimum sentence shall be the guideline sentence.‖).   
 
The plea agreement also provided that, if Savani 
provided substantial assistance to the government, the 
government might request the court to depart below the 
7 
applicable mandatory minimum, the applicable guideline 
range, or both, when imposing his sentence.  At Savani’s 
sentencing, the government moved, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(e) and U.S.S.G. § 5k1.1, for the court to depart from 
the mandatory minimum and to impose a sentence within the 
Sentencing Guidelines range of 63 to 78 months’ 
imprisonment.  The District Court not only granted the 
motion to depart, it departed further than the government had 
requested and imposed a sentence of 46 months, which was 
below the mandatory minimum.   
 
Savani died on January 29, 2013. 
B.  Sean Herbert               
In January 2008, Herbert entered into a cooperation 
plea agreement with the government and pled guilty to one 
count of possession with intent to distribute in excess of 50 
grams of crack cocaine and powder cocaine, in violation of §§ 
841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A).  In the plea agreement, the 
parties agreed that Herbert was involved in the distribution of 
more than 50 and less than 150 grams of crack cocaine and 
more than 300 grams and less than 400 grams of powder 
cocaine.  They also agreed that a sentence within the 
applicable range of the Sentencing Guidelines would be a 
reasonable sentence.  At that time, the base offense level 
dictated by the crack cocaine guideline for Herbert’s 
conviction was 30.  See § 2D1.1(c) (Nov. 2007).  After 
receiving a three level downward adjustment, his total 
adjusted offense level was 27.  Based upon this total offense 
level and his criminal history category of III, Herbert’s initial 
guideline sentencing range was 87-108 months of 
imprisonment.  See § 5A.  However, because of the amount of 
8 
crack cocaine involved in the offense, Herbert was subject to 
a ten-year mandatory minimum, under § 841(a)(1)(A).  See § 
1B1.1(h) (Nov. 2007).  Therefore, the guideline sentence was 
deemed to be the 120 months mandatory minimum.  See § 
5G1.1(b). 
 
The plea agreement also provided that if Herbert 
provided substantial assistance to the government, the 
government might request a departure below the statutory  
mandatory minimum and/or the guideline range.  At Herbert’s 
June 2008 sentencing, the government moved, pursuant to § 
3553(e) and U.S.S.G. § 5k1.1, for the court to depart below 
the applicable mandatory minimum to impose a sentence of 
110 months.  The District Court granted the motion and, after 
considering additional factors, sentenced Herbert to 98 
months of incarceration.   
 
C.  Richard Roe               
In April 2008, Roe entered into a cooperation plea 
agreement with the government and pled guilty to two counts 
of distribution of five grams or more of crack cocaine and two 
counts of distribution of 50 grams or more of crack cocaine, 
all in violation of § 841(a)(1).  As part of the plea agreement, 
he stipulated that his offense involved 189.6 grams of crack 
cocaine.  At that time, the base offense level for that amount 
of crack cocaine was 32, see § 2D1.1(c) (Nov. 2007); Roe 
then received a three-level reduction for acceptance of 
responsibility, yielding a final offense level of 29.  With this 
offense level and his criminal history category of V, Roe’s 
initial guideline sentencing range was 140-175 months’ 
imprisonment.  See § 5A.  However, due to a prior drug 
conviction, Roe was subject to a statutory mandatory 
9 
minimum sentence of 240 months.  See 21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(b)(1)(B); § 1B1.1(h) (Nov. 2007).  Because the 
mandatory minimum sentence exceeded the initial guideline 
sentencing range, the mandatory minimum became the 
guideline sentence.  See § 5G1.1.   
   
Roe’s plea agreement also contained a provision that if 
he provided substantial assistance to the government, it might 
move for a sentence below the statutory mandatory minimum.  
At Roe’s April 2008 sentencing, the government moved 
under § 5K1.1 and § 3553(e) for a reduction of Roe’s 
sentence.  The District Court granted the government’s  
motion and sentenced Roe to 96 months’ imprisonment.   
 
D.  Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 
On August 3, 2010, after appellants’ sentencings, the 
FSA became law.  Designed as ―[a]n Act To restore fairness 
to Federal cocaine sentencing,‖ United States v. Dixon, 648 
F.3d 195, 197 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Fair Sentencing Act of 
2010, Pub. L. 111–220, § 2, 124 Stat. 2372, 2372 (2010)), one 
provision of the FSA modified the mandatory minimum crack 
cocaine penalties by raising the quantities required to trigger 
the five-year and ten-year mandatory minimum penalties, id. 
(citing Pub. L. 111–220, § 2).  These changes reduced the 
disparity in triggering quantity between powder cocaine and 
crack cocaine from 100:1 to approximately 18:1.  Id.   
 
The FSA also directed the Sentencing Commission to 
promulgate emergency amendments to conform the 
Sentencing Guidelines to the statutory changes.  Id. (citing 
Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 8).  The Sentencing Commission 
complied with this directive by issuing temporary emergency 
10 
guideline amendments in 2010, see id. at 197-98 (citing 
U.S.S.G. Supp. to App. C, amend. 748 (Supp. 2010) 
(amending U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)) (effective Nov. 1, 2010)), 
which became permanent and retroactively applicable on 
November 1, 2011, see U.S.S.G., App. C., amends. 750, 759.  
One of these, Amendment 750, amended U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, 
reducing by the same 18:1 ratio the amount of crack cocaine 
necessary to trigger the mandatory minimums.  See U.S.S.G., 
App. C., amend. 750. 
 
Based upon Amendment 750, appellants filed motions 
for reduction of sentence pursuant to § 3582(c)(2).  In all 
three cases, the district courts denied the motions.
2
  These 
appeals followed.  
 
II.  Jurisdiction 
The district courts had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, 
and our review is plenary.  Doe, 564 F.3d at 307 n.2.   
 
III.  Discussion   
Congress has generally prohibited district courts from 
―modify[ing] a term of imprisonment once it has been 
imposed.‖  18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).  Section 3582(c)(2), 
                                              
2
  In Savani and Herbert, the district courts denied the 
motions without explanation.  In Roe, the court applied § 
3582(c)(2) and concluded that a sentencing reduction would 
not be consistent with the applicable policy statements issued 
by the Sentencing Commission.   
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however, offers a limited exception to this general rule of 
finality: 
   
[I]n the case of a defendant who has been 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a 
sentencing range that has subsequently been 
lowered by the Sentencing Commission 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(o), upon motion of 
the defendant . . . the court may reduce the term 
of imprisonment, . . . if such a reduction is 
consistent with applicable policy statements 
issued by the Sentencing Commission. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).   
 
In United States v. Flemming, 617 F.3d 252, 257 (3d 
Cir. 2010), we interpreted this provision to provide that if a 
defendant fails to satisfy either of these conditions, a 
sentencing range lowered by the Sentencing Commission or a 
reduction consistent with the applicable policy statements, the 
court cannot consider a sentence reduction.  Id.  On the other 
hand, if the defendant satisfies both requirements, the district 
court may exercise its discretion to determine whether a 
reduction of sentence is merited.  Id.  
 
In considering whether appellants are eligible for a 
reduction of sentence, we turn first to the second condition 
because that is the condition which we held in Doe prevented 
offenders, who were subject to a mandatory minimum 
sentence, from seeking relief under the FSA. 
 
Doe also involved offenders who had been sentenced 
below the mandatory minimum.  John and Jane Doe were 
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sentenced respectively to 84 and 41 months’ imprisonment.  
Doe, 564 F.3d at 307-08.  Their sentences reflected a 
downward departure, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) and 
U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, from their statutory  mandatory minimum 
sentences of life imprisonment for John and 20 years for Jane.  
Their mandatory minimums exceeded their initial guideline 
sentencing ranges of 151-188 months imprisonment for John 
and 121-151 months for Jane.  Doe, 564 F.3d at 307-08.  
After the Does were sentenced, the Sentencing Commission 
promulgated Amendment 706, a retroactive amendment, 
which revised § 2D1.1 by lowering the base offense levels for 
most quantities of crack cocaine.  Id. at 308.  The Does then 
filed motions for sentencing reductions under § 3582(c)(2), 
id., contending that they were eligible for resentencing 
because Amendment 706 lowered their ―applicable guideline 
ranges,‖3 id. at 311. 
 
Because at that time the Sentencing Guidelines failed 
to contain a definition of the phrase ―applicable guideline 
range,‖ the Doe Court examined the Application Instructions 
contained in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 for guidance.  Based upon its 
interpretation of these instructions, the Court reasoned that 
the Guidelines ―language and structure‖ established that the 
                                              
3
  The term ―applicable guideline range‖ appears in U.S.S.G. 
§ 1B1.10, Reduction of Term of Imprisonment as a Result of 
Amended Guideline Range (Policy Statement), which 
provides for the reduction of sentences pursuant to § 
3582(c)(2).  One exclusion barring such a reduction occurs if 
the amendment does not have the effect of lowering the 
defendant’s ―applicable guideline range.‖  § 1B1.10(2)(B). 
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term ―applicable guideline range‖ in § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B) 
referred to the sentence calculated under § 5G1.1(b).  Id. at 
311.  In that regard, the Court noted that the Application 
Instructions for the Guidelines specified that they must be 
applied in a particular order, see U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 (Nov. 
2007), with the eighth and last step in the procedure being the 
calculation of all statutory mandatory minimums under § 
5G1.1(b).  Therefore, although the crack cocaine offense level 
along with the criminal history category guideline determined 
the initial guideline sentencing range, it was not the 
―applicable guideline range‖ because the mandatory 
minimum sentence replaced it and served as the basis for 
calculating the defendant’s final pre-departure sentence.4  See 
Doe, 564 F.3d at 311.  In other words, the Doe Court 
concluded that ―applicable guideline range‖ referred to the 
guideline sentence determined by the statutory mandatory 
minimum, which was the end product under § 1B1.1(a).  
Flemming, 617 F.3d at 262.   
 
It is not disputed that this interpretation of ―applicable 
guideline range‖ leaves appellants ineligible for relief.  
However, the situation has changed.  Since our Doe opinion, 
the definition of ―applicable guideline range‖ has been added 
to the guidelines by the retroactive November 2011 
amendment which revised Application Note 1(A) to the 
                                              
4
  In a concurring opinion Judge Fuentes noted that the 
language of § 1B1.10 ―barely favors the majority’s 
interpretation‖ and that ―further guidance from the Sentencing 
Commission‖ on the meaning of the term ―applicable 
guideline range‖ would be beneficial.  Doe, 564 F.3d at 318 
(Fuentes, J., concurring).   
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commentary of § 1B1.10.  According to the revised 
commentary, the ―applicable guideline range‖ is ―the 
guideline range that corresponds to the offense level and 
criminal history category determined pursuant to § 1B1.1(a), 
which is determined before consideration of any departure 
provision in the Guidelines Manual or any variance.‖  
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 cmt. n.1(A) (2011).  Appellants contend 
that the Sentencing Commission intended this definition to 
supersede Doe and to clarify that ―applicable guideline range‖ 
refers to the initial guideline range as determined by the 
intersection of the offense level and criminal history category 
under § 5A. The government, on the other hand, argues that 
the newly provided definition supports the Doe Court’s 
interpretation of ―applicable guideline range.‖   
 
Although we, as a three-judge panel, are generally 
bound by prior decisions of this Court, we ―may reevaluate a 
precedent in light of intervening authority and amendments to 
statutes or regulations.‖  Reich v. D.M. Sabia Co., 90 F.3d 
854, 858 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Joshua, 976 
F.2d 844, 853 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that a panel is ―free to 
consider the [Sentencing] Commission’s [newly adopted 
interpretive] commentary and, based thereon, reach a decision 
contrary to the holdings of [prior precedent]‖)).  Thus, in light 
of the Commission’s amendments, we will revisit the Doe 
Court’s prior interpretation of ―applicable guideline range.‖  
We will keep in mind that guidelines commentary, 
interpreting or explaining the application of a guideline, is 
binding on us when we are applying that guideline because 
we are obligated to adhere to the Commission’s definition.  
See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 43 (1993).  
In support of their position, appellants point out that 
the terminology the Commission selected for the description 
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of ―applicable guideline range‖ mirrors, in-part, the language 
of § 1B1.1(a)(7).  Section 1B1.1(a)(7) requires the sentencing 
court to calculate a defendant’s initial guideline sentence by 
―[d]etermin[ing] the guideline range‖ from the table in § 5A 
―that corresponds to the offense level and criminal history 
category determined‖ in steps (a)(1)-(a)(6).  § 1B1.1(a)(7) 
(emphasis added).  In Application Note 1(A) of § 1B1.10, the 
Sentencing Commission defines ―applicable guideline range‖ 
as ―the guideline range that corresponds to the offense level 
and criminal history category determined pursuant to § 
1B1.1(a) . . . .‖  § 1B1.10 cmt. n.1(A) (2011) (emphasis 
added).   
 
We presume that this choice of language by the 
Sentencing Commission is deliberate.  Appellants contend 
that the Sentencing Commission’s choice to incorporate this 
language into the new definition of ―applicable guideline 
range‖ demonstrates the Commission’s intent to define the 
phrase as the initial guidelines sentencing range calculated 
under § 5A; if the Commission had not intended such a result, 
it would not have utilized this language.  Appellants urge that 
the sentencing range ascertained at § 1B1.1(a)(7) is the result 
of the culmination of steps § 1B1.1(a)(1)-(a)(6), i.e., that the 
steps of § 1B1.1(a)(1)-(a)(6) are the prerequisite steps the 
sentencing court must proceed through before it can reach 
step § 1B1.1(a)(7) and determine the range associated with 
the offense level and criminal history category.  Thus, the 
definition’s reference to § 1B1.1(a), combined with the 
inclusion of terminology that mirrors § 1B1.1(a)(7), indicates 
that the Commission intended ―applicable guideline range‖ to 
refer to the intersection between the offense level and 
criminal history category at § 1B1.1(a)(7), not the sentence 
16 
required by a mandatory minimum as subsequently 
determined at step § 1B1.1(a)(8).
5
  
 
Although we find appellants’ argument logical, 
nonetheless there is ambiguity in the Sentencing 
Commission’s new definition of ―applicable guideline range.‖  
It is not expressly stated that the Commission intended the 
term ―applicable guidelines range‖ as calculated under § 
1B1.1(a) to refer only to the steps of § 1B1.1(a)(1)-(a)(7) and 
not to include § 1B1.1(a)(8).  Accordingly, a second 
interpretation exists, i.e., that a defendant’s ―applicable 
guideline range‖ includes all eight steps delineated under § 
1B1.1(a), including § 1B1.1(a)(8).  This approach is 
supported by the language of the amendment that the 
―applicable guideline range‖ is ―determined before 
consideration of any departure provision in the Guidelines 
Manual or any variance.‖  § 1B1.10 cmt. n.1(A) (2011).  
Sections 1B1.1(b) & (c) provide when departure provisions 
and variances must be applied.  This competing 
interpretation, advocated by the government, assumes that 
because the sentencing court must consider all eight steps of § 
1B1.1(a) before it applies §§ 1B1.1(b) & (c), a defendant’s 
―applicable guideline range‖ cannot be ascertained until all 
eight steps of § 1B1.1(a) have been completed.  
                                              
5
  This reading conforms to the reality of the sentencing 
process.  A defendant is not assigned a new offense level or 
criminal history category by operation of the mandatory 
minimum.  Rather, the guideline range that is applicable to 
that offense level and criminal history category is simply 
trumped by the mandatory minimum  sentence when the 
sentencing court applies step § 1B1.1(a)(8). 
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On the other hand, a reading of ―applicable guideline 
range‖ as the range calculated at step § 1B1.1(a)(7) would be 
entirely consistent with the Commission’s definition of the 
phrase, as long as step § 1B1.1(a)(8) was considered before 
applying §§ 1B1.1(b) and (c).     
 
In the end, we must conclude that the definition of 
―applicable guideline range‖ contained in the revised 
Application Note 1(A) to the commentary of § 1B1.10 is 
ambiguous.  Because the definition provided by the 
Sentencing Commission does not by itself resolve the issue, 
we will examine other provisions of the Sentencing 
Guidelines to determine whether they give us any insight into 
the Commission’s definition. 
 
A.  2011 Historical Notes for § 1B1.10 
The Historical Notes for § 1B1.10 state that the 
Commission revised Application Note 1 and defined 
―applicable guideline range‖ ―to address an application issue‖ 
regarding ―when, if at all, the [sentencing] court applies a 
departure provision.‖  U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 Historical Notes 
(Reason for Amendment).  This need for clarification arose 
because of a circuit split.  Id.  Several Courts of Appeals had 
held that sentencing courts might consider some departures 
before calculating a defendant’s applicable guideline range; 
others had held that the applicable guideline range must be 
determined prior to the court’s consideration of any 
departures.  Id.  The Commission resolved this dispute by 
amending the commentary and clarifying that the latter 
approach was the proper one.  Id.  This explanation does not, 
however, offer any insight into whether the Commission 
intended the amendment to refer solely to the intersection 
18 
between the offense level and criminal history category, as 
determined by the culmination of steps § 1B1.1(a)(1)-(a)(7), 
or to the guideline sentence of a mandatory minimum 
determined at step § 1B1.1(a)(8), the final step before 
applying § 1B1.1(b) & (c). 
 
Another concern with the Commission’s explanation 
for the revision is the fact that at the time the Commission 
defined ―applicable guideline range,‖ it was likely aware that 
at least eleven Courts of Appeals had concluded that a 
defendant was ineligible for a sentencing reduction in 
circumstances in which the statutory mandatory minimum 
exceeded the guideline range and the defendant received a 
substantial assistance departure below the mandatory 
minimum sentence.  See, e.g., United States v. Roa-Medina, 
607 F.3d 255, 260 (1st Cir. 2010); United States v. Williams, 
551 F.3d 182, 186-87 (2d Cir. 2009); Doe, 564 F.3d at 311-
12; United States v. Hood, 556 F.3d 226, 234-35 (4th Cir. 
2009); United States v. Carter, 595 F.3d 575, 580-81 (5th Cir. 
2010); United States v. Johnson, 564 F.3d 419, 422-23 (6th 
Cir. 2009); United States v. Poole, 550 F.3d 676, 679-80 (7th 
Cir. 2008); United States v. Baylor, 556 F.3d 672, 673 (8th 
Cir. 2009); United States v. Jackson, 577 F.3d 1032, 1034-36 
(9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Williams, 549 F.3d 1337, 
1339-42 (11th Cir. 2008); United States v. Cook, 594 F.3d 
883, 886-89 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  If the Commission intended to 
overrule these Courts of Appeals, why did it not explicitly say 
that it was doing so?   
 
B.  Application Note 3 for § 1B1.10 
In addition to defining ―applicable guideline range,‖ 
the Commission also revised § 1B1.10 ―to change the 
19 
limitations that apply in cases in which the term of 
imprisonment was less than the minimum of the applicable 
guideline range at the time of sentencing.‖  U.S.S.G. § 
1B1.10 Historical Notes (Reason for Amendment).  After the 
amendment, a defendant, whose original sentence had been 
reduced below the applicable guideline range, could seek § 
3582(c)(2) relief only if he had originally been granted the 
reduced term as a result of substantial assistance to the 
government.  See § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B).       
 
In addition, Application Note 3 provides examples of 
how to calculate the reduced sentence under § 3582(c)(2).  It 
then discusses § 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction when the 
defendant’s original sentence was reduced following a 
government motion for substantial assistance, and states: 
 
The provisions authorizing such a government 
motion are 5K1.1 (Substantial Assistance to 
Authorities) (authorizing, upon government 
motion, a downward departure based on the 
defendant’s substantial assistance); 18 U.S.C. 
3553(e) (authorizing the court, upon 
government motion, to impose a sentence below 
a statutory minimum to reflect the defendant’s 
substantial assistance); and Fed. R. Crim. P. 
35(b) (authorizing the court, upon government 
motion, to reduce a sentence to reflect the 
defendant's substantial assistance).  
 
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 Application Note 3 (2011) (emphasis 
added). 
Appearing as it does in a Commentary Section directed 
at clarifying the reduction of sentences under § 3582(c)(2), 
20 
this last paragraph appears to contemplate that a defendant 
who was sentenced below his applicable mandatory minimum 
because he received a § 3553(e) reduction for substantial 
assistance, might be eligible for a sentencing reduction.  If we 
were to hold that the ―applicable guideline range‖ language of 
§ 1B1.10(a)(2)(B) rendered such a defendant ineligible for a § 
3582(c)(2) reduction, what is the point of the above quoted 
language in Application Note 3?     
 
Another interpretation of this provision, however, 
supports the government’s argument.  In circumstances in 
which the initial guideline range, as determined pursuant to § 
1B1.1(a)(7), exceeds the mandatory minimum sentence, and 
the government files a motion under § 5K1.1 and § 3553(e), 
courts often depart below both the guideline range and the 
mandatory minimum when imposing the final sentence.  
Accordingly, the Application Note might simply clarify that, 
in that scenario, a court may grant a comparable reduction 
below the original guideline range but not below the 
mandatory minimum.   
 
C.  U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b) 
Section 5G1.1 supports Appellants’ reading of 
―applicable guideline range‖ as the intersection between the 
offense level and criminal history category, as calculated 
under § 1B1.1(a)(7).  In the sentencing process, after the court 
completes its calculation under step § 1B1.1(a)(7), step § 
1B1.1(a)(8) directs it to apply, among other provisions, 
§ 5G1.1.  Section 5G1.1, in turn, refers to the sentence that 
has already been calculated under § 1B1.1(a)(7) as ―the 
applicable guideline range.‖  U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b) (―Where a 
statutorily required minimum sentence is greater than the 
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maximum of the applicable guideline range, the statutorily 
required minimum sentence shall be the guideline sentence.‖ 
(emphasis added)).  Thus, before the sentencing court 
proceeds to complete the step at § 1B1.1(a)(8), the language 
of § 5G1.1 provides that the ―applicable guideline range‖ has 
already been determined. 
 
D.  Application Note 1(A) to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10   
The Commentary to § 1B1.10 supports the 
government’s argument and adds further ambiguity to the 
meaning of ―applicable guideline range.‖  Immediately 
preceding the description of ―applicable guideline range,‖ the 
commentary states that a sentencing reduction is not 
authorized when ―the amendment does not have the effect of 
lowering the defendant’s applicable guideline range because 
of the operation of another guideline or statutory provision 
(e.g., a statutory mandatory minimum term of 
imprisonment).‖  § 1B1.10 cmt. n.1(A) (2011).  Although 
appellants assert that this provision addresses only those 
situations in which the imposition of a sentence below the 
mandatory minimum range was not due to a substantial 
assistance departure, no such distinction is drawn in the 
language of the Commentary.  In regard to the above, the 
District Court observed that it is difficult to imagine what 
purpose the statement would serve if a mandatory minimum 
sentence was irrelevant to the determination of the applicable 
guideline range.   
 
In sum, we conclude that our review of these 
provisions has not helped us ascertain the meaning of the 
Commission’s definition of ―applicable guideline range.‖ 
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E.  Rule of Lenity  
In circumstances in which an ambiguous criminal 
statute cannot be clarified by its ―text, structure, history, [] 
purpose,‖ Barber v. Thomas, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 2499, 
2508 (2010), or reasonable inferences drawn from the overall 
statutory scheme, the rule of lenity provides that we must 
resolve that ambiguity in favor of the defendant.  Flemming, 
617 F.3d at 269 (quoting United States v Pollen, 978 F.2d 78, 
85 (3d Cir. 1992)); see Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 65 (1995) 
(―The rule of lenity applies only if, after seizing everything 
from which aid can be derived, we can make no more than a 
guess as to what Congress intended.‖) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Courts should not, however, apply 
this rule whenever confronted with a difficult interpretative 
question.  Instead, its application is limited to instances in 
which there is a ―grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the 
statute, such that the Court must simply guess as to what 
Congress intended.‖  Barber, 130 S. Ct. at 2508-09 (citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted).  We have previously 
held that the rule of lenity applies to the Sentencing 
Guidelines.  Flemming, 617 F.3d at 271-72.   
 
As discussed above, we believe that the guidelines are 
―grievous[ly] ambiguous‖ and hopelessly imprecise regarding 
the Commission’s description of ―applicable guideline range‖ 
contained within the revised Application Note 1(A) to the 
commentary of § 1B1.10.   Without ―guess[ing]‖ what the 
definition means, we cannot definitively resolve whether it 
defines the phrase as the initial sentencing range calculated 
under § 1B1.1(a)(7), or if it includes the statutory mandatory 
minimum sentence determined at step § 1B1.1(a)(8).  As both 
interpretations are entirely plausible and nothing in the 
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guidelines provides definitive insight into the accuracy of 
either reading, we conclude that we must apply the rule of 
lenity and resolve the ambiguity in appellants’ favor.  See 
e.g., id. at 270-72; United States v. Bustillos-Penna, 612 F.3d 
863, 868-69 (5th Cir. 2010) (applying rule of lenity to 
conclude that a provision of the Sentencing Guidelines was 
ambiguous).
6
   
                                              
6
 We are aware that our decision today conflicts with the 
Eleventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Glover, 686 
F.3d 1203 (11th Cir. 2012).  There, the defendant was 
convicted of a crack-related offense and had an initial 
guidelines range—188-235 months’ imprisonment—that was 
below his mandatory minimum of life in prison.  Id. at 1204.  
The defendant received a downward departure for substantial 
assistance and a sentence of 204 months’ imprisonment.  Id. 
at 1205.  The defendant sought a sentence reduction pursuant 
to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) based on Amendments 750 and 
759, but the Eleventh Circuit held that he was ineligible 
because ―[the defendant]’s guidelines range was—and still 
is—life in prison.‖  Id. at 1208. 
 
We believe the Eleventh Circuit’s decision was based on an 
incorrect interpretation of the phrase ―applicable guidelines 
range.‖  The Glover court began, as we did, by highlighting 
the importance of the phrase ―applicable guideline range‖ to 
the ultimate determination of whether a defendant ―has been 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing 
range that has subsequently been lowered,‖ 18 U.S.C. § 
3582(c)(2).  See Glover, 686 F.3d at 1206.  However, the 
Eleventh Circuit only analyzed the phrase as it appears in 
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B) and Application Note 1(A) before 
24 
In reaching this result we note that we cannot view the 
guidelines and the definition of ―applicable guideline range‖ 
in a vacuum.  First, we must keep in mind that the Sentencing 
Commission recognizes that defendants who provide 
substantial assistance deserve special consideration.  See 76 
Fed. Reg. 41332-01, 41334 (July 7, 2011) (noting that ―[t]he 
guidelines . . . have long recognized that defendants who 
provide substantial assistance are differently situated than 
other defendants,‖ and stating that the revisions 
―appropriately maintain[] this distinction and further[] the 
                                                                                                     
deciding that § 3582(c), § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B), and Application 
Note l(A) ―all make it clear that . . . an amendment that alters 
the initial calculation of a guidelines range is not to be applied 
in a case where the difference in the initial calculation would 
have made no difference because a mandatory minimum 
would have trumped the initial calculation and dictated the 
final guidelines range anyway.‖  See Glover, 686 F.3d at 
1206.  If the provisions the Eleventh Circuit analyzed were 
the full extent of the relevant statutory language, we would 
agree that ―applicable guidelines range‖ refers to the 
mandatory minimum and not to the initial guidelines range.  
But the Eleventh Circuit did not address the use of 
―applicable guidelines range‖ as it appears in U.S.S.G. § 
5G1.1(b).  As we have explained, we cannot reconcile the 
Sentencing Commission’s use of the phrase in § 5G1.1(b)—
which unquestionably refers to the initial guidelines range 
and not to the mandatory minimum—with the Eleventh 
Circuit’s reading of the phrase in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B) 
and Application Note 1(A).  For that reason, we reach a 
different conclusion than Glover.  
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purposes of sentencing‖).  Also, we must be cognizant of the 
general policies underlying the FSA and Amendment 750.  
As discussed above, after Congress adopted the FSA to 
remedy the disparity between crack and powder cocaine 
penalties, it directed the Sentencing Commission to 
promulgate emergency amendments to conform the 
guidelines to the statutory changes.  One of these 
amendments, Amendment 750, retroactively lowered the 
crack cocaine base offense levels in § 2D1.1 to reflect the 
reduced 18:1 ratio between powder and crack cocaine 
adopted by the FSA.  
 
If appellants had been sentenced after Amendment 750 
took effect, the amount of crack cocaine involved in Savani 
and Herbert’s offenses of conviction would not have triggered 
the amended mandatory minimum statutory provisions; the 
amount involved in Roe’s offense would have triggered a 
mandatory minimum of only five years.  If we had interpreted 
―applicable guidelines range‖ in the manner that the 
government suggests, it would render appellants ineligible for 
sentencing reductions merely because they were sentenced 
prior to the adoption of retroactive Amendment 750.  Such a 
result is antithetical to the Fair Sentencing policy concerns 
that motivated Congress in passing the FSA.  See Flemming, 
617 F.3d at 271-72.
7
   
                                              
7
 For the reasons stated above, insofar as United States v. 
Hippolyte, --- F.3d ----, No. 11-15933, 2013 WL 978695 
(11th Cir. Mar. 14, 2013), differs in the definition of 
―applicable guideline range,‖ we find it unpersuasive.  
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IV.  Conclusion 
For the above reasons, we hold that, when a defendant 
was subject to a mandatory minimum term and was sentenced 
to a term pursuant to the guidelines but below the mandatory 
minimum as a result of a § 3553 motion by the government, 
and when the sentencing range is later lowered by the 
Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(o), that 
defendant is eligible to move for reduction of sentence 
pursuant to § 3582(c)(2).  Because the district courts that 
sentenced these defendants either held that the defendant was 
not eligible for a reduction because of the mandatory 
minimum or did not state whether the § 3553 motion was 
being denied as a matter of law because of the mandatory 
minimum or a matter of discretion, we will vacate the orders 
and remand the Herbert and Roe cases to their respective 
courts for further proceedings in accord with Freeman v. 
United States, --- U.S. ----, 131 S. Ct. 2685, 2695 (2011) 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) and with the discretion of the 
district courts.  Because Savani died while his appeal was 
pending, we will dismiss the appeal as moot and remand this 
case to the district court to abate the judgment of sentence.  
United States v. DeMichael, 461 F.3d 414, 417 (3d Cir. 
2006). 
1 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment: 
 
 I join the judgment vacating Herbert‟s and Roe‟s 
sentences.  I concur with the majority that the new definition 
of “applicable guideline range” provided by Amendment 759 
to the Sentencing Guidelines, which clarifies when a 
defendant is eligible for resentencing based on certain 
substantive amendments to the Guidelines, supersedes our 
holding in United States v. Doe, 564 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2009).  
Ante at 13-14.  I write separately because, unlike the majority, 
I do not find any ambiguity in the new definition of 
“applicable guideline range.”  In my view, the Federal 
Sentencing Act of 2010 (“FSA”), made applicable to Herbert 
and Roe (“Petitioners”) through Amendment 750 to the 
Guidelines, lowered their “guideline range that corresponds to 
the offense level and criminal history category determined 
pursuant to § 1B1.1(a).”  U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 app. n.1(A) 
(2011); see also U.S.S.G. app. C., amend. 750 (Nov. 1, 2011).  
Accordingly, I would hold that Petitioners are eligible for 
resentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) based on the plain 
text of Amendment 759.  I would not resort to the rule of 
lenity when a clear answer is provided by the language of the 
Guidelines. 
 
A. The Text of the Application Notes to Section 1B1.10 
 
 To be eligible for resentencing consistent with 18 
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, Petitioners must 
meet two requirements: (1) their sentences must be “based 
on” a Guidelines range, and (2) an applicable Guidelines 
amendment must have “the effect of lowering” that range.  
United States v. Thompson, 682 F.3d 285, 290 (3d Cir. 2012).  
2 
The relevant issue here is whether Petitioners meet the second 
part of this test based on the Fair Sentencing Act amendments 
to the crack-cocaine Guidelines, which ultimately turns on 
whether the amendments lowered Petitioners‟ “applicable 
guideline range.”   
 
In Doe we held that defendants such as Petitioners who 
were convicted of crack-cocaine related offenses and exposed 
to a statutory mandatory minimum sentence that exceeded 
their guideline range, calculated under U.S.S.G. 
§ 1B1.1(a)(7), but were sentenced below that minimum 
pursuant to a substantial assistance motion based on U.S.S.G. 
§ 5K1.1, were ineligible for resentencing.  See Doe, 546 F.3d 
at 309.  We reasoned that “applicable guideline range,” a term 
then not defined by the Guidelines, referred to the statutory 
minimum sentence calculated at step 8 of the sentencing 
process, which was not affected by the crack-cocaine 
amendments.  Id. at 312.  We rejected the contention that 
“applicable guideline range” referred to the range calculated 
based on the defendant‟s offense level and criminal history 
category, under step 7 of the initial sentencing calculation, 
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1(a)(7).  Id. at 311.
1
 
Amendment 759, however, for the first time defined 
“applicable guideline range” by amending Application Note 
1(A) of § 1B1.10.  The effect of this amendment is that the 
Guidelines now explain that “[e]ligibility for [resentencing] 
                                              
1
 These steps were designated as (a) through (h) before 
November 1, 2010 but on that date were re-designated as (1) 
through (8) in order to “adopt[] the three-step approach 
followed by a majority of circuits in determining the sentence 
to be imposed.”  U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 741 (effective Nov. 
1, 2010). 
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under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) is triggered only by an 
amendment . . . that lowers . . . the guideline range that 
corresponds to the offense level and criminal history category 
determined pursuant to § 1B1.1(a), which is determined 
before consideration of any departure provision in the 
Guidelines Manual or any variance.”  U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 app. 
n.1(A) (2011) (emphasis added); see also U.S.S.G. app. C., 
amend. 759 (Nov. 1, 2011). 
 
This language could not be clearer in demonstrating 
that our conclusion in Doe was incorrect.  Following the 
Application Note‟s reference to § 1B1.1(a), it is immediately 
obvious that only under one of the steps listed in that section 
does the court “[d]etermine[s] the guideline range . . . that 
corresponds to the offense level and criminal history category 
determined”—step 7, which is set forth in § 1B1.1(a)(7).  In 
other words, as the majority agrees, the language of the 
calculation mandated by § 1B1.1(a)(7) is the exact language 
that appears in the provision governing eligibility for 
resentencing, § 1B1.10, Application Note 1(A).  See ante at 
15-16.  Indeed, one of the provisions explicitly cross-
references the first.  Accordingly, the natural reading is that 
Application Note 1(A)‟s reference to the range calculated 
“pursuant to § 1B1.1(a)” means the guideline range calculated 
in step 7 of § 1B1.1(a).      
 
The Government‟s contention that the definition of 
“applicable guideline range” may continue to refer to the 
mandatory minimum sentences of step 8, § 1B1.1(a)(8), falls 
flat for that reason—under no other step of § 1B1.1(a) is a 
range determined based on a previously calculated offense 
level and a criminal history.  As the majority recognizes, the 
computation of mandatory minimums at step 8 does not 
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involve sentence “ranges” or the recalculation of offense 
levels or criminal history categories.  See id. at 16 n.5. 
 
Nevertheless, the Government insists that the reference 
to § 1B1.1(a) in the amended Note 1(A) is ambiguous 
because “[i]t is not expressly stated that the Commission 
intended the term „applicable guideline range‟ as calculated 
under § 1B1.1(a) to refer only to the steps of § 1B1.1(a)(1)-
(a)(7) and not to include § 1B1.1(a)(8).”  The majority 
appears to credit that argument.  Id. at 16. 
 
But, in this context, we ought to reject reading 
ambiguity into the statute based on what it did not but could 
have said.  It is true that the cross-reference in Application 
Note 1(A) is to § 1B1.1(a) generally and not specifically to 
§ 1B1.1(a)(7).  However, an explicit reference to clause (7) is 
not needed, given that the language of Note 1(A) already 
exactly tracks the language of clause (7).  Requiring any 
further granularity from each cross-reference that may appear 
in the Guidelines is overkill.  After all, the definition of 
“applicable guideline range” in Note 1(A) also mentions the 
“offense level and criminal history category determined 
pursuant to § 1B1.1(a)” without specifically noting that the 
referenced “offense level” is determined under clauses (1)-(5) 
of § 1B1.1(a), or that the noted “criminal history category” is 
determined under clause (6) of § 1B1.1(a).  No one would 
argue that such references are ambiguous because they do not 
particularly list the relevant subsection of § 1B1.1(a).  
Accepting the Government‟s argument would inject 
ambiguity into an otherwise “logical” reading of a statute, 
5 
ante at 16, based on what the statute does not say.  In my 
view, this violates basic tenets of statutory construction.
2
 
 
The Government also seizes on the second clause in 
the new definition of “applicable guideline range,” which 
specifies that such range is “determined before consideration 
of any departure provision in the Guidelines Manual or any 
variance.”  According to the Government, because all eight 
steps in § 1B1.1(a), including the mandatory minimum, are 
calculated before the consideration of departures or variances, 
“applicable guideline range” could also refer to the 
mandatory minimum.     
But the reference to when the “applicable guideline 
range” is determined does not matter for purposes of this 
                                              
2
 To be fair, the Government‟s argument was recently 
accepted by the Eleventh Circuit in a case where the 
defendant, unlike the Petitioners, was sentenced to the 
mandatory minimum.  United States v. Hippolyte, __ F.3d __, 
No. 11-15933, 2013 WL 978695 (11th Cir. Mar. 14, 2013).  
The Court reasoned that the reference to § 1B1.1(a) must be a 
reference to step 8 because under § 1B1.1(a) “one necessarily 
is required to take into account the mandatory minimum 
sentences that may be statutorily required,” id., at *4, but 
despite this held that Hippolyte was ineligible for 
resentencing because “the new definition of applicable 
guideline range . . . nowhere mentions statutorily required 
mandatory minimum sentences” and “has nothing to do with 
mandatory minimums.”  Id.  Because it is inconsistent to 
conclude that the new resentencing eligibility criteria both has 
“nothing to do” with mandatory minimums but also refers to 
the mandatory minimums calculated at step 8 of § 1B1.1(a), I 
find unpersuasive the reasoning of Hippolyte. 
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analysis.  The guideline range calculated at step 7 of 
§ 1B1.1(a) is “determined before consideration of any 
departure provision in the Guidelines Manual or any 
variance.”  While it is true that the mandatory minimum of 
step 8 is also determined “before consideration” of departures 
or variances, so too are all the other calculations mandated by 
§ 1B1.1(a).  The argument could only work by inserting the 
word “immediately” so that the definition of “applicable 
guideline range” would be that which is “determined 
immediately before consideration” of any departure or 
variance.  But that is not what Application Note 1(A) says.   
 
The Government‟s remaining arguments based on the 
Application Notes to § 1B1.10 are not persuasive.  The 
additional language in Application Note 1(A) merely clarifies 
that regardless of the effect of a substantive amendment on 
the range calculated at step 7, a defendant is not eligible for 
resentencing if he was instead sentenced to a statutory 
minimum and not to a sentence based on the guideline range.  
But this is irrelevant in the cases before us as Petitioners were 
not sentenced to a statutory mandatory minimum.  But see 
United States v. Glover, 686 F.3d 1203 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(refusing to grant relief under Amendment 759 to defendant 
not sentenced to statutory minimum); United States v. 
McClain, 691 F.3d 774 (6th Cir. 2012) (same).  And there is 
no basis in the language of Application Note 3 to draw a 
distinction between defendants whose guidelines range was 
higher than their mandatory minimums and those whose 
range was below it, and a reading supporting such result is 
contrary to the clear statutory purpose of the FSA—to lower 
the sentences of all crack-cocaine offenders.  See also Doe, 
564 F.3d at 318 (Fuentes, J., concurring). 
 
7 
 In sum, because I believe that the language of the 
statute at issue here makes clear that the FSA and its 
amendments had the effect of lowering Petitioners‟ 
“applicable guideline range,” no foray into other provisions of 
the Guidelines is necessary, nor do we need to invoke the rule 
of lenity.  Our role is to give meaning to these plain words in 
light of the overall purpose of the statute, and in particular the 
amendments to the crack-cocaine guidelines mandated by the 
FSA.  Our statutory inquiry should be at an end.  See Conn. 
Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) (“[I]n 
interpreting a statute, a court should always turn first to [this] 
one, cardinal canon before all others. . . . When the words of a 
statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: 
judicial inquiry is complete.”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).
3
 
 
 
 
 
B. Third Circuit Cases Decided Since The Enactment 
of Amendment 759 
 
                                              
3
 The other provisions the majority cites do not change this 
analysis.  The failure of the Historical Notes to § 1B1.10 to 
explicitly endorse my reading of “applicable guidelines 
range” does not inject ambiguity into the clear language of 
the statute.  Were a statute‟s legislative history‟s failure to 
endorse a proposed reading of a statute a sufficient reason to 
reject such reading, few statutory interpretation cases would 
be resolved by the courts.   
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The Government also contends that cases decided 
since the enactment of Amendment 759 support its view that 
the approach in Doe remains good law.  I disagree.   
 
The most relevant cases are those involving career 
offenders, where we have held that defendants exposed to 
career offender guidelines but granted departures from those 
guidelines are not eligible for resentencing under crack-
cocaine amendments.  See, e.g., United States v. Ware, 694 
F.3d 527, 529, 530 (3d Cir. 2012); United States v. Barney, 
672 F.3d 228, 231-32 (3d Cir. 2012). But Ware and Barney 
are consistent with my reading of “applicable guideline 
range” because in career offender cases the applicable 
guideline range is still calculated at step 7.  That range is 
based on an applicable offense level and criminal history 
category that the career offender guidelines may have altered 
at step 6 of the calculation.  In such context, it makes perfect 
sense to say that the “applicable guideline range . . . is „the 
range dictated by the Career Offender Guidelines.‟”  Ware, 
694 F.3d at 535 (quoting Barney, 672 F.3d at 232).  Although 
a court may then calculate an alternative guideline range after 
granting a departure, it remains the case that the career 
offender guidelines range is calculated at step 7, and that such 
range is not affected by the FSA.  By contrast, when a 
defendant is exposed to a statutory minimum, neither the 
offense level nor criminal history category change—the range 
corresponding to those levels has already been calculated at 
step 7. 
 
C. Whether Petitioners’ Sentences Were “Based On” a 
Guidelines Range 
 
9 
Petitioners must also demonstrate that their sentence 
was “based on” a Guidelines range.  See Thompson, 682 F.3d 
at 290.   Herbert‟s substantial cooperation agreement stated 
the parties‟ view that the crack-cocaine range was reasonable.  
When the District Court granted the Government‟s motion for 
a sentence below the mandatory minimum, it also adopted the 
crack-cocaine guideline range and sentenced defendant within 
that range.  Thus, Herbert‟s sentence was factually “based on” 
a guidelines range.   
 
The Government nevertheless has suggested that our 
decision in United States v. Winebarger, 664 F.3d 388, 396 
(3d Cir. 2011), means that Herbert‟s sentence could not 
legally be “based on” a guidelines range.  In Winebarger, 
which was decided after Herbert was sentenced, we held that 
it was improper for a sentencing court to consider factors 
other than those relating to the defendant‟s assistance in 
deciding how far below the statutory minimum to depart, but 
did not preclude consideration of the seriousness of the 
offense in deciding to limit the scope of a departure.  
Winebarger, 664 F.3d at 396 (citing United States v. Casiano, 
113 F.3d 420, 430 (3d Cir. 1997)).  Thus, Winebarger does 
not categorically preclude defendants like Herbert from 
meeting the first part of the test required for resentencing.
4
   
D. Conclusion 
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 In a subsequent submission the Government conceded that 
Winebarger does “not play a role in the government‟s 
primary argument.” Govt. 28(j) Letter of June 25, 2012 at 4-
5.  Nevertheless, the Government still contends that “a below-
mandatory sentence resting on a cooperation motion is never 
„based on‟ an alternative guideline range.”  Id. at 5. 
10 
I do not disagree with the majority‟s analysis of why 
application of the rule of lenity would also require us to 
vacate Petitioners‟ sentences.  See ante at 22-26.  But to 
justify application of the rule in the first place, we must face 
more than “a difficult interpretative question.”  Id. at 22.  I do 
not find such grievous ambiguity. 
 
Although these cases appear to be frustratingly 
complex, they are not.  While the parties foray into other 
cases and other provisions of the Guidelines, this is 
unnecessary because our post-Doe jurisprudence has not 
addressed squarely the issue presented here; only Amendment 
759 speaks directly to that question and does so in a clear 
manner.  That amendment, in my view, clearly states that the 
“applicable guideline range” of a defendant is calculated at 
§ 1B1.1(a)(7), even if he is exposed to a statutory mandatory 
minimum.  I would give effect to this language by deciding 
this case as a matter of statutory construction.  Nothing in the 
remainder of the application notes to § 1B1.10 or other 
provisions of the Guidelines changes this result.  So long as 
the defendant was not sentenced to the statutory minimum, he 
is eligible for resentencing based on the FSA.     
 
Accordingly, I concur in the judgment vacating 
Petitioners‟ sentences but cannot join the reasoning used to 
reach that result. 
